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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
November 2, 1994 
Ms. Marilyn Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FILED 
NOV 4 1994 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Salt Lake City 
Re: Joe D. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. Case No. 930635-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
On September 21, 1994, the court heard oral argument in the above-captioned case. 
Thereafter, I became aware of a recently issued Utah Supreme Court decision relevant to this 
case, in particular the argument raised by my client, appellee, Mrs. Fields Cookies, in its 
brief regarding the trial court's reconsideration of a prior decision denying summary 
judgment. See Brief of Appellee, at pp.7-8. Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Practice, I write to inform you of this case. 
On September 20, 1994, in Ron Shepherd Insurance v. Shields. 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 (Sept. 20, 1994, Utah), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a subsequently assigned district 
court judge may rule on a motion for summary judgment despite the fact that the previously 
assigned judge entered an unsigned minute order granting the same. The Utah Supreme 
Court wrote "[i]t is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point 
prior to entry of a final order or judgment." id. at 6. Shepherd makes clear that a trial court 
may consider reargument of a party's position on a summary judgment motion "at any point 
prior to entry of a final order or judgment." Id. at fh 4. A copy of the Shepherd case is 
attached for your convenience. 
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Page 2 
Also, by way of information, during appellant's reply oral argument, appellant's 
counsel, Mr. Fericks, represented to the court that Mrs. Fields Cookies continues to use the 
video "What We Stand For". This statement is simply incorrect and not supported by the 
record. 
Very truly yours, 
Deno G. Himonas 
Enclosure 
cc: Russell Fericks 
Michael Ward 
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UTAH STATc 
LAW UBF4RV 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Ron Shepherd Insurance, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V, No. 930475 
William Scott Shields, F I L E D 
Jeffrey G. Shields, Donald R. September 20, 1994 
Mayer, and Universal Business 
Insurance, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Ronald Shepherd Insurance, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, and Ron 
Shepherd, an individual, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
William Gerald Shields, Marilyn 
Shields, Jeffrey Shields, William 
Scott Shields, Jack Turner, and 
Universal Business Insurance, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellees. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs 
M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
RUSSON, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Ronald Lee Shepherd and Ron Shepherd 
Insurance, Inc. (RSI), appeal from the trial court's denial of 
their motion entitled "Motion for Reconsideration" and its entry 
of summary judgment in favor of defendants William Gerald 
Shields, Marilyn Shields, William Scott Shields, Jeffrey Shields, 
Donald R. Mayer, and Universal Business Insurance, Inc. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On December 13, 1988, Shields;Insurance, Inc., entered 
into a written agreement with a company recalled Insurance, Inc. , 
in which Insurance, Inc., agreed to assume $200,000 of debts owed 
to the creditors of Shields Insurance,cine., in exchange for an 
agreement that the agents of Shields^Insurance, Inc., would 
(1) transact no further business under the name of Shields 
Insurance, Inc., and (2) sign over, all checks to and write all 
new business through Insurance, Inc. The agreement further 
stated: 
6. Amendment. Neither this Agreement 
nor any term [or] provision hereof may be 
changed, waived, discharged or terminated 
orally or in any manner other than by an 
instrument in writing signed by the parties 
hereto. 
The agreement was signed by William Gerald Shields, Marilyn 
Shields, William Scott Shields, and Jeffrey Shields on behalf of 
Shields Insurance, Inc., and by Ron Shepherd on behalf of 
Insurance, Inc. 
Shortly thereafter, due to Insurance, Inc.'s inability 
to obtain appointments from major insurance companies to write 
insurance, Ron Shepherd and the Shieldses orally agreed that 
(1) RSI would assume Insurance, Inc.'s rights and 
responsibilities under the above agreement, and (2) the agents of 
Shields Insurance, Inc., would write all new business through 
RSI, instead of Insurance, Inc. From December 13, 1988, to 
May 26, 1990, all of the Shieldses7 insurance transactions showed 
RSI as the "agent of record." 
On May 26, 1990, William Scott Shields, Jeffrey 
Shields, and another insurance agent, Donald R. Mayer, removed 
1
 Plaintiffs additionally brought suit against Jeffrey 
Shields' father-in-law, Jack Turner, for failure to pay his 
portion of the debts owed to the creditors of Shields Insurance, 
Inc., pursuant to an agreement between Turner and Ron Shepherd. 
However, since defendants' motion for summary judgment does not 
address Turners liability, that cause of action is not before us 
on appeal. 
2
 Insurance, Inc., was a Utah corporation incorporated in 
1981. It is not a party to these proceedings because it was 
dissolved in June 1988 for failure to pay franchise taxes and 
file an annual statement. 
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over 600 fii^^^^^the offices of RSI and transported them to 
Universal>Business^Insurance, Inc., an insurance agency 
establishedrtoy^the two Shieldses and Mayer. In response to the 
removal^joftlthe^fil^s/ plaintiffs filed two actions against 
defendants:/-one for a writ of replevin ordering the two 
Shieldses and Mayer to return the files; the second for breach of 
contract against all defendants. On December 31, 1990, the trial 
court granted the writ of replevin for the pendency of the action 
or until further order of the court and ordered the return of the 
files to RSI. The two actions were subsequently consolidated. 
On January 14, 1993, defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing because 
they were not parties to, and had no rights under, the 
December 13, 1988, written agreement between Insurance, Inc., and 
Shields Insurance, Inc. On February 26, 1993, following a 
hearing before Third District Judge Leslie A. Lewis, an unsigned 
minute entry was made which reads in pertinent part: 
This case is before the court for 
hearing on defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, appearances as shown above. 
The motion is argued to the court by 
counsel and submitted. The court being fully 
advised grants the motion for summary 
judgment, as read into the record. 
On March 4, 1993, with neither a signed order granting 
defendants' motion nor a signed judgment entering summary 
judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs filed a "Motion for 
Reconsideration11 of the trial court's bench ruling. Plaintiffs 
based their motion on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59, asserting 
that they had obtained "newly discovered evidence."3 This new 
3
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides in pertinent 
part: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in 
an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, 
material for the party making the 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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evidence was set forth in two affidavits filed with the motion: 
one by William Schmitt, a former employee of both RSI and Shields 
Insurance, Inc., and one by Ron Shepherd. Both affidavits 
supported plaintiffs7 claim that there was an oral agreement 
among the parties that RSI would assume Insurance, Inc.'s rights 
and responsibilities under the December 1988 agreement. 
Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs' motion, but before the trial court could consider the 
matter, plaintiffs moved for the recusal of Judge Lewis on the 
basis of alleged feelings of animosity between Ron Shepherd and 
Judge Lewis's brother. In an unsigned minute entry, Judge Lewis 
found that she "could be impartial and fair, but to avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety," recused herself from the case. 
At no time did Judge Lewis sign an order granting defendants' 
motion for summary judgment or a judgment entering summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
The case was subsequently reassigned to Third District 
Judge John A. Rokich. On September 7, 1993, following a hearing 
on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, Judge Rokich denied 
the same in a signed order which reads: 
Plaintiffs' Motion for reconsideration 
of the summary judgment previously granted in 
this matter, came before the Court for 
hearing on August 24, 1992. . . . After 
reviewing the memoranda of the parties and 
hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court 
hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs' Motion for reconsideration 
of the summary judgment previously entered is 
hereby denied and defendants are granted 
judgment against plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs appeal, challenging (1) Judge Lewis's 
February 26, 1993, bench ruling granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and (2) Judge Rokich's September 7, 1993, order 
denying their motion for reconsideration and entering summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
3
 (Footnote continued.) 
application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at trial. 
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JUDGE LEWIS'S BENCH RULING 
As an initial matter, we address plaintiffs' attempt to 
challenge Judge Lewis's February 26, 1993, bench ruling on 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. That ruling appeared 
only as an unsigned minute entry. It is well settled that " [a]n 
unsigned minute entry does not constitute an entry of judgment, 
nor is it a final judgment for purposes of [appeal].11 Wilson v. 
Manning, 645 P.2d 655, 655 (Utah 1982); accord State v. Crowley, 
737 P.2d 198, 198-99 (Utah 1987); South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718 
P.2d 405, 406 (Utah 1986); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61, 
63, 433 P.2d 1, 3 (1967); Hartford Accidenr & Indem. Co. v. 
Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 419, 135 P.2d 919, 922 (1943). Because 
Judge Lewis never signed an order granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment nor entered judgment thereon, there is not a 
final order or judgment by Judge Lewis to be considered. The 
only appealable order in this case is Judge Rokich's September 7, 
1993, order denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that Judge Rokich erred in 
denying their motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's bench 
ruling on deiendant's motion for summary judgment.4 Defendants 
As noted above, after Judge Lewis stated from the bench 
that she was granting defendants' motion, plaintiffs filed a 
motion for reconsideration, asserting a right to file their 
motion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59's provision that a 
trial court may open a judgment and enter a new judgment on the 
basis of "newly discovered evidence." Plaintiffs' motion was 
supported by two affidavits stating that Ron Shepherd and the 
Shieldses had orally agreed that RSI would assume Insurance, 
Inc.'s rights and responsibilities under the December 1988 
agreement between Shields Insurance, Inc., and Insurance, Inc. 
Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, asserting that (1) the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for such a motion, 
and (2) that if the motion was deemed proper under rule 59, the 
affidavits did not qualify as "newly discovered evidence" because 
the facts averred therein were known to the affiants prior to 
Judge Lewis's bench ruling. 
Concerning defendants' first argument, this court has 
consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not 
provide for a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's order 
or judgment, see, e.g.. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 
1061, 1064 (Utah 1991); Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 
P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980); Peav v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842-43 
(Utah 1980) ; Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 
2d 211, 214, 469 P.2d 1, 3 (1970), but has reviewed motions so 
entitled if they could have properly been brought under some rule 
(Continued on the next page.) 
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respond that (1) plaintiffs' motion was not properly before the 
trial court because plaintiffs did not meet any of the 
circumstances specified in rule 59 that permit relief under that 
rule, and (2) even considering plaintiffs' "newly discovered 
evidence," the trial court nonetheless correctly denied 
plaintiffs7 motion for reconsideration. 
Rule 59, according to its plain language, applies only 
to motions for new trials or amendments of judgments. 
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of Judge Lewis's bench 
ruling was therefore not properly brought under that rule since 
no signed order or judgment was ever entered as a consequence of 
that ruling. There was no order or judgment signed by Judge 
Lewis to be reviewed under rule 59. 
It is settled law that a trial court is free to 
reassess it's decision at any point prior to entry of a final 
order or judgment. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 
1985) . In the present case, because no final order awarding 
defendants summary judgment was signed and entered, the matter 
was still pending when plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was 
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every right to fully 
reassess the matter and, if deemed appropriate, to receive 
additional evidence. When Judge Lewis recused herself and the 
matter was assigned to Judge Rokich, he likewise had every right 
to fully review the matter. 
Pursuant to his authority to hear this matter, Judge 
Rokich heard plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on August 23, 
1993, and on September 7, 1993, issued an order denying the same. 
However, that order fails to state his grounds for denying the 
motion. While Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) does not 
require findings of fact in regard to summary judgments, the rule 
does require a written statement by the court of the grounds for 
4
 (Footnote continued.) 
and were merely incorrectly titled. See, e.g., Watkiss, 808 P.2d 
at 1064-65. In the present case, because Judge Lewis never 
signed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment 
nor entered judgment thereon, plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration was, in essence, not a motion for reconsideration 
at all, but simply a reargument of their opposition to 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, which a trial court is 
free to entertain at any point prior to entry of a final order or 
judgment. See, e.g., Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 
1985). Accordingly, it was not improper for the trial court to 
consider plaintiffs' motion or for this court to consider it on 
appeal. 
5
 See supra note 3. 
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its decision.6 This was not done in the present case. This is 
especially significant here because, due to the lack of a 
transcript, we cannot ascertain whether Judge Rokich considered 
all of the issues concerning defendants' motion for summary 
judgment or simply the "new evidence" presented by plaintiffs in 
their motion for reconsideration or whether Judge Rokich based 
his order and judgment solely on defendants' argument in their 
memorandum opposing plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration that 
our rules of civil procedure do not provide for such a motion, 
which, while true, is irrelevant to the case at bar. See supra 
note 4. Because failure to issue a statement of grounds is 
generally not reversible error, see Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 
817 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1991), we do not remand on this ground 
but proceed to address plaintiffs' appeal from the gram: of 
summary judgment in Judge Rokich's September 7, 1993, order.' 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues 
of material fact remain and the moving party is enrirled ro 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hicains v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because we 
resolve only legal issues on appeal from a summary judgment:, we 
do not defer to the trial court's rulings. Ferree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. "We 
6
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides, with our 
emphasis: 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon. . . . Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous 
. . • . The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
ruling on motions, except as provided in 
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue 
a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
7
 We do, however, "take this opportunity to remind trial 
judges that the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded 
trial court rulings *has little operative effect when members of 
this court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of 
the cryptic nature of its ruling.'" Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 958 
n.4 (Utah 1992) (quoting Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty 
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992)). 
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determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that 
there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree, 784 
P.2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson. 672 
P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 
436 (Utah 1982)). 
"Summary judgment allows the parties to pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether a material issue of fact exists 
that must be resolved by the fact finder." Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (citing Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundqren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)). In 
accordance with this rule, ,f[t]he party moving for summary 
judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the 
applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact. A party opposing the motion is reguired only to show that 
there is a material issue of fact." Id. (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). Moreover, as to questions concerning 
material issues of fact, "[a]ffidavits and depositions submitted 
in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact 
exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less 
persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed in a trial 
on the merits." Id. Accordingly, "[bjecause this is an appeal 
from a summary judgment, we review the factual submissions to the 
trial court in a light most favorable to finding a material issue 
of fact." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 
(Utah 1992) (citing King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 
P.2d 858 (Utah 1992)). "A genuine issue of fact exists where, on 
the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could 
differ" on any material issue. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 
615 (Utah 1982). 
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we 
conclude that material issues of fact remain that require 
reversal and remand of this case. At the time of plaintiffs' 
motion for reconsideration before Judge Rokich, the record 
included plaintiffs' complaint and the affidavits supporting 
their motion.8 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged in pertinent part: 
As we have already stated, plaintiffs' motion was 
premature because Judge Lewis's ruling had not been reduced to a 
written judgment. It therefore follows that the affidavits were 
of no force or effect in connection with that premature motion. 
However, when the case was later assigned to Judge Rokich and he 
conducted his hearing, which was in essence a reargument of the 
motion for summary judgment, it was within his discretion to 
consider the affidavits in connection with that motion, 
especially because defendants did not move to strike them as 
untimely filed or not otherwise properly before the court. 
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10. It was agreed between the sellers 
and the purchasers that all insurance written 
through the Shields Agency prior to December 
of 1988 would be changed to show Shepherd as 
the agent of record and all insurance written 
by the Shields Defendants after December of 
1988 would be written through Shepherd. 
Plaintiffs' affidavits in support of their motion for 
reconsideration, one by William Schmitt, a former employee of 
both RSI and Shields Insurance, Inc., and one by Ron Shepherd, 
both alleged the existence of an oral agreement between Ron 
Shepherd and the Shieldses that RSI would assume Insurance, 
Inc.'s rights and responsibilities under the written agreemenr 
between Insurance, Inc., and Shields Insurance, Inc. 
Specifically, Schmitt's affidavit stated in pertinent parr: 
4. During the latter part of the month 
of December 1988, [Schmitt] was present when 
Jeffrey Shields and William Scott Shields 
told William Gerald Shields that if the sale 
of the Shields Agency was to be completed, it 
would have to be done through [RSI], not 
Insurance Inc. 
5. [Schmitt] and all other salaried 
employees of the Shields Agency received 
their pay checks covering the period 
December 15 through 31, 1988 from [RSI]. 
6. On or about January 15, 1989, 
[Schmitt] and all other employees of the 
Shields Insurance Agency moved to . . . the 
insurance offices of [RSI]. 
7. Effective December 31, 1988, 
[Schmitt] and all other salaried employees 
who worked for the Shields Agency became 
employees of [RSI] and received their payroll 
checks from the said [RSI] thereafter. 
Ron Shepherd's affidavit stated in pertinent part: 
7. Immediately after the Sales 
Agreement [between Shields Insurance, Inc., 
and Insurance, Inc.,] was signed, [Shepherd] 
contacted all insurance carriers with whom 
[Shepherd] and the Shields defendants would 
be placing insurance to obtain an appointment 
of Insurance Inc. as an insurance agency. 
8. [Shepherd] soon found that at 
December of 1988, no major insurance carriers 
Q No. 930475 
were appointing new agents, therefore, no 
insurance could be written by Insurance Inc. 
9. This fact was disclosed by 
[Shepherd] to the Shields defendants just 
prior to Christmas of 1988, whereupon, all 
parties agreed that the purchaser of the 
Shields Agency would have to be changed from 
Insurance Inc. 
10. For the reasons stated above, the 
Sales Agreement was orally modified at that 
time by all of the parties; however, the 
written agreement between the parties was not 
changed and signed by the parties. 
11. The oral agreement reached by the 
parties just prior to Christmas of 1988, was 
implemented on a day to day basis; all 
insurance written by the Shields defendants 
was written through [RSI] as agency of record 
and no insurance was written through 
Insurance Inc. 
12. The agreement that the buy out 
would be by [RSI] was made by all the parties 
prior to the time that the Shields defendants 
accepted money from [Shepherd] to pay their 
bills and prior to the time that the Shields 
defendants moved their offices into the 
offices of [RSI] . . . . 
Defendants did not file countering affidavits in response to 
plaintiffs' affidavits.9 
The allegations in plaintiffs' complaint, along with 
plaintiffs' affidavits, are clearly sufficient to raise questions 
of material fact concerning the existence of the oral agreement 
between the parties and, if it did exist, whether the alleged 
oral agreement was actually a modification of the prior written 
agreement or was a new contract between Ron Shepherd and the 
Shieldses that simply embraced the same terms as the written 
agreement between Insurance, Inc., and Shields Insurance, 
9
 We note that even if countering affidavits had been filed, 
it would not change the outcome of this case because the 
existence of countering affidavits would plainly indicate that 
issues of material fact were in dispute. 
Inc.10 Additional material issues of fact exist concerning the 
actual parties who entered the oral agreement, that is, whether 
the Shieldses and Shepherd entered the oral agreement as 
individuals or on behalf of Shields Insurance, Inc., and 
Insurance, Inc., respectively, and if they entered the oral 
agreement on behalf of the two corporations, whether such could 
be done in light of the language of the written agreement. 
Accordingly, we conclude that issues of material fact remain that 
preclude an award of summary judgment in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order and 
judgment denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and 
granting judgment in favor of defendants is reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief 
Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
10
 The record also reveals inconsistencies as to whether 
Shields Insurance, Inc., is a c t u a l* y<? corP°ration. In the 
December 1988 written agreement and throughout the early part of 
the proceedings below, it is referred to as Shields Insurance, 
Inc. Later, Shields Insurance, *™J*# Js changed to simply the 
Shields Agency. This matter shqulfl-aiso be addressed on remand. 
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